ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
The course aims are to provide the basic tools for the analysis of imperfectly competitive markets and for understanding the economic motivations of antitrust interventions. At the end of the course the students should be able to combine the basic models and to apply them for the analysis of a variety of cases.
Microeconomics, Mathematical economics
0) Game Theory and basic oligopoly models (Bertrand, Cournot, Hotelling) (MM Ch. 9; T various chapters + appendix, O various chapters)
1) Competition Policy (MM Ch. 1)
2) Sequential Games and applications (Stackelberg, Free entry in Bertrand and Cournot models, Localization and prices in Hotelling model) (T various chapters + appendix, O various chapters, Lecture notes, Mas-Colell, Whinston e Green, Microeconomic Theory, Ch 12, section C)
3) Collusion (MM Ch. 4; Lecture notes, Ch 14 O, Mas-Colell, Whinston e Green, Microeconomic Theory, Ch 12, section D)
4) Predatory Pricing: Entry barriers: Dixit-Spence model; Milgrom and Roberts limit price model (MM Ch. 4, T, Lecture notes, Mas-Colell, Whinston e Green, Microeconomic Theory, Ch 12, Appendix B; Bagwell e Wolinsky, Game Theory and Industrial Organization, 2002).
The course is organized into 3-frontal lectures per week (7 hours) (10 weeks in total). There are tutorials (12 hours) during which students will be asked to solve exercices. A worksheet is provided at the end of every week.
M.Motta, Competition Policy Theory and Practice, CUP, 2004 (MM)
For an introduction to Industrial Organization: J, Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988 (T),
For an introduction to Game Theory: M.Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press, 2004 (O).
Learning progression is monitored through the tutorials. The final exam consists in a compulsory written test comprising multiple choice test items and closed-ended questions.